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Abstract 
With the recent global economic downturn, International Oil Corporations (IOCs) are increasingly focused on 
exploring business opportunities in regions with significant projected growth opportunities such as Africa and 
Asia. Several IOCs have recently flocked to Nigeria, a prominent West African country, with the recent stable 
political climate, immense population (about 170 million), and projected double digit growth rate, and so the 
country has quickly become a destination of choice for small and large international companies, alike, seeking to 
take advantage of the perceived business opportunities therein. Thus, this paper evaluates the current state of 
common law and statutory amendments governing pre-incorporation contracts in Nigeria within the context of 
similar rules in the commonwealth countries around the world. It seeks to provide protection to the company, the 
promoters, the shareholders and the third parties who have entered into pre-incorporation contracts with the 
promoters prior to the formal incorporation of the company. In making recommendations for amending the 
current Nigerian statutory law on pre-incorporation contracts, the authors propose rules that must balance the 
privacy of the company’s contracts while making sure fairness and equity are extended to all stakeholders. Most 
of the recommendations suggested take into consideration the peculiar economic environment that Nigerian 
businesses operate within, i.e., where there is paucity of information and where official facts are not almost 
readily available, hence, the recommendation for a notarized copy of the pre-contract stating its value in the 
objects and memorandum of association of the company, especially where the value of the pre-incorporation 
contract is equal or greater than the total value of the allotted shares of the company. 
 
I. Introduction 
The Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act, Cap 20, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) of 
1990, (now of 2004) (“CAMA”)1 does not expressly define a “pre-incorporation contract.” Thus, we adopt the 
working definition provided under Section 71 of the South Africa’s Companies Act 71 of 2008:2 
A pre-incorporation contract is an agreement entered into before the incorporation of a company 
by a person who purports to act in the name of, or on behalf of, the company, with the intention 
or understanding that the company will be incorporated and will thereafter be bound by the 
agreement.3 
 
From this definition, two (2) issues clearly arise: (1) the distinction in Kelner v Baxter, 4  and 
Newbourne vs Sensolid Ltd,5 as to how the promoter signed the pre-incorporation contract is no more of 
relevance, i.e., whether the promoter was acting in the name of the company or on behalf of the company—he 
will always be an Agent of the Company; (2) Second, the focus is now on the intention or understanding that 
the company (a) will be incorporated and (b) will thereafter be bound by the agreement. 
It is trite law that the goal of company law is to encourage entrepreneurship and enterprise efficiency, 
create flexibility and simplicity in the formation and maintenance of companies, and, to provide for the creation, 
role, and uses of companies in a manner that enhances economic welfare of the citizenry.6 Whether corporate 
                                                 
1
. CAMA refers to the current operative Companies/Corporations law legislation in Nigeria, known as the Companies and 
Allied Matters Act. This was formerly referred to as the Companies and Allied Matters Decree, 1990. However, by the 
consolidation of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria in 1990, it was re-designated as the Companies and Allied Matters 
Act, Cap 59, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, (LFN) 1990. This 1990 Act is now replaced and amended by the Companies 
and Allied Matters, Act Cap 20, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN), 2004. For ease of reference, it will be referred to as 
“CAMA” in this paper. 
2
. South Africa’s Companies Act 71 of 2008. The purpose of this Act in South Africa was to encourage entrepreneurship and 
enterprise efficiency, to create flexibility and simplicity in the formation and maintenance of companies, and to provide for 
the creation, role, and use of companies in a manner that enhances the economic welfare of South Africa. The South Africa 
Companies Act 2008 also introduced an extensive and renewed approach to the regulation of pre-incorporation contracts 
towards addressing the shortcomings in the South African company law jurisprudence. It was signed into law on April 8th, 
2009 and has April 2011 as the proposed date of coming into effect. 
3
. See, Section 1 of the South Africa Companies Act, No 71 of 2008. 
4
. (1866) L.R.2CP 174. 
5
. (1954) 1 Q.B. 45. 
6
. See generally, MARYKE ALLETTA BOONZAIER, PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACTS AND THE LIABILITY OF 
THE PROMOTERS, a Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Laws 
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rules governing the status of pre-incorporation contract in Nigeria serve the above goals remain to be decided. 
Earlier on, the one hundred and fifty (150) years old rigid rule of Kelner v. Baxter, governed English Law, with 
most common law countries following this rule to the effect that no pre-incorporation contract1 was binding 
upon a company, nor could the company adopt such contracts.2 The old Kelner v. Baxter rule further stated that 
for the company to be bound by pre-incorporation contract, a new contract must be made between the newly 
incorporated company and the contracting party.3 Over time, that rigid Kelner v. Baxter rule was considered in 
most common law countries as “unsatisfactory and replete with serious difficulties for promoters, companies and 
the public at large.” 4 Therefore, Kelner vs Baxter and its progeny of cases on this subject became “highly 
technical and inconvenient and it had become clearly desirable that they should be abrogated.”5  
Most commonwealth countries commenced statutory amendments. For instance, in 1926, South Africa 
attempted statutory amendments in this regard.6 Nigeria also effected amendments in 1990 by the introduction of 
Section 72 of the CAMA. It is necessary, therefore, that, about twenty-five years after the statutory amendment, 
the advantages, disadvantages, and legal and economic consequences of Section 72 of CAMA which now makes 
statutory provisions for pre-incorporation contracts be evaluated to see how far the problems introduced by 
Kelner vs Baxter and its progeny of cases have been ameliorated in Nigeria and in other commonwealth 
countries.7 As Professor Gross had rightly warned: 
“We should bear in mind that most existing solutions are not satisfactory since they do not cover the 
various aspects of the subject. A comparative outlook might therefor[e] be of some help to the 
legislators who intend to codify this complicated aspect of company law.”8 
 
In carrying out a comparative assessment of the statutory interventions, this paper shall consider the historical 
context and development surrounding common law rules governing pre-incorporation contracts starting with 
Kelner vs Baxter and the interplay and influence of the rules common law of agency.9 It shall also carry out a 
comparative assessment and examination of current statutory laws governing pre-incorporation contracts in 
similar jurisdictions. It shall identify the impact, success, shortcomings and complications arising from the post 
1990 CAMA introduction of section 72 amendments. Finally, using the ut res magis valeat quam pereat theory, 
suggestions are proffered for future amendments. 
The usefulness of this work is undeniable since stakeholders, including promoters, shareholders, 
subscribers, stock allottees, creditors, suppliers and everyone who transacts businesses with newly formed 
corporations must apprise themselves of the rules discussed herein and the suggestions proffered due to existing 
latent traps for the unwary. The work also educates stakeholders towards safeguarding investors’ economic 
interest in pre-incorporation contracts. Finally, under Pareto-Hicks cost-benefit analysis, the work is important 
since litigation costs and expenses would further be reduced and/or avoided. 
                                                                                                                                                        
(LLM), in the Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria, South Africa, November 2010, at page iii. (Hereinafter “Maryke 
Boonzaier”). 
1
. Some authors refer to pre-incorporation contracts as preliminary contracts. Se, e.g., MICHAEL A. ADAMS, ESSENTIAL 
CORPORATE LAW 15-16 (1st ed.2002); M. J. Whincop, An Economic and Jurisprudential Genealogy of Corporate Law 
(Ashgate, Aldershot 2001) 59. 
2
. Joseph H. Gross, Liability on Pre-incorporation Contracts: A Comparative Review, 18 McGill Law Journal 513 (1972). 
(“Gross”). 
3
. Ibid. Per Gross at 513. 
4
. Ibid. Per Gross at 513; See, also, 1nterim Report of the Select Committee on Company Law of Ontario (Lawrence Report), 
1967 P. 10; Leon Getz, Pre-incorporation contracts: some proposals, (1967), U.B.C.L. Rev. 383; F.J. Nugan, Pre-
incorporation Contracts in Studies in Canadian Company Law (ed. by Ziegel, S.S., 1967), at p. 197; Report of the Israel 
Committee on Company Law (Zeltner Committee), 1965, para. 2; Joseph H. Gross, The Problem of Pre-incorporation 
Contracts, (1964), 21 Hapraklit, at p. 38;  Gower, Report on Company Law in Ghana, (1961), at p. 32; and Jenkins 
Committee 1962 (Cmnd. 1749), para. 44. 
5
. Ibid. Per Gross at 513. 
6
. See Maleka Femida Cassim, Pre-Incorporation Contracts: The Reform of Section 35 of the Companies Act 2007, 124 
South Africa Law Journal (Vol. 2) 365; See, also, Caroline B. Ncube, Pre-Incorporation Contracts: Statutory Reform, 126 
South Africa Law Journal (Vol. 2) 260. 
7
. In this discuss, via a comparative approach, we apprise the theoretical background, present state of the law, and the most 
probable future impact of Section 72 of CAMA which makes statutory provisions on pre-incorporation contracts in Nigeria. 
8
. See Gross, supra note 8, at 513. 
9
. See, Harry Rajak, Sourcebook of Company Law, 2nd Edition(1995) ( Jordans);  H.R. Hahlo and J.H.Farrar, Hahlo’s Case 
and Materials on Company Law, 3rd Edition(1987), 173 London Sweet and Maxwell; LS Sealy, Cases and Materials in 
Company Law, 7th Edition(2001), Butterworths; Robert R Pennington’s, Company Law, 7th Edition (1995), 108 
Butterworths London Dublin and Edinburgh; Simon Gaulding, Company Law,2nd Edition(1999), Cavendish Publishing Ltd. 
London,Sydney. 
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The term, ut res magis valeat quam pereat is a latin term that mandates that courts must try to construe 
a law in a way to make sense, rather than voiding it, and that a law should be given effect rather than be 
destroyed.1: 
Another general rule in the construction of the charters is that such a presumption shall be made ‘ut 
res magis valeat quam pereat,’ that is, that the object ot the grant shall be attained rather than 
defeated. It has even been said that nothing is to be inferred from usage to cripple the grant.2 
Therefore, in this short commentary, we shall: (a) examine the common law background to Section 72 of the 
Nigerian CAMA; (b) carry out a comparative study of the state of the law on pre-incorporation contracts in other 
common law and civil law countries; (c) critique and assess the effect and impact of statutory attempts to 
ameliorate and remove the obstacles posed by Kelner vs Baxter and its common law progeny; and, (d) finally, 
proffer suggestions for the future of company law, by examining how Nigerian courts can adopt the ut res magis 
valeat quam pereat rule, with the intent to establish a doctrinal approach for all courts to always decipher and 
construct statutes and agreements to be operative rather than inoperative and to decongest the court’s dockets of 
several redundant interlocutory and technical applications. 
II. Origin of the Problems Associated With Pre-Incorporation Contracts 
Prior to the registration/incorporation of a corporation, it is normal for the promoters of the proposed 
company to negotiate and enter into contracts on behalf of the proposed or future corporation,3 towards a smooth 
sailing into the corporate-hood.4  
[L]ike a human being, a company does not drop from the sky. It is brought into legal existence 
through the activities and efforts of persons-called promoters, who take all the steps necessary for 
the establishment of the company.5  
 
These transactional acts of the promoters are governed by principles of Agency Law6 along with Company Law 
statutes and case law.7 Since the purported company would require some services prior to its incorporation, such 
as acquisition of physical properties to be used as offices, recruitment of employees/key personnel to carry on 
the business activities (once incorporated), purchase of furniture and setting up of bank accounts and undertaking 
of the actual registration (e.g., lawyers, accountants and courier services). Business-wise, it is unwise and 
imprudent like for the company to wait till registration, before the lease, employment, engagement of 
professional services and/or banking activities could take place.8 This point was aptly stated by Nah Fuashi9 
thus: 
Companies, like human beings, must be conceived before they are born. The conception and the 
gestation period of Companies are managed by a category of persons technically known in 
company law as promoter. Before birth (incorporation) that is between conception and [its 
registration], promoters enter into contracts on behalf of the yet to be born company.10 
 
This sets the background for the legal and philosophical issues arising from pre-incorporation contracts which 
can be contentious.11 This is due to the infiltration of purely technical agency principles which mandate that for a 
                                                 
1
. See USLegal. Available at: http://definitions.uslegal.com/u/ut-res-magis-valeat-quam-pereat/. Last accessed on 10th 
October 2014. 
2
. See, Holroyd J in Rex v Cotterill (1817) 1 B & Ald 81. 
3
. In this work, the terms “Company” and “Corporation”; and “Companies” and “Corporations,” shall be used 
interchangeably as referring to the business entity that is used to carry on business in Nigeria after registration with the 
Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission (“CAC”). 
4
. Pre-incorporation contracts are inevitable features of every newly formed company. See, PAUL L. DAVIES, ed., in 
GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW (1997) at page 144.  
5
. See C.K. Agomo, The Status of Pre-incorporation Contracts, in ESSAYS ON COMPANY LAW (E.O Akanki ed, 
University of Lagos Press, 1992) 77. (Hereinafter “Agomo”). 
6
. J.H. Gross, PreIncorporation Contracts, (1971) 87 LQR 367. (Hereinafter “Gross II”). 
7
. See J. OLAKUNLE OROJO, COMPANY LAW ANMD PRACTICE IN NIGERIA, 3rd ed. (Lagos: Mbeyi and Associates, 
1992), at 99 (Hereinafter “Orojo”). 
8
. YVES GUYON, DROIT DES AFFAIRES TOME 1, (1996) at pages 165-166. (Hereinafter “Guyon”). 
9
. See NAH Thomas FUASHI, Pre-Incorporation Contracts and the Impossibility of Ratification Under Common Law- The 
Salutary Jettison of a Stifling Principle by the Civil Inspired Uniform Act Relating to Commercial Companies and Economic 
Interest Groups Enacted by OHADA in UNIVERSITĒ DE DSCHANG, ANNALES DE LA FACULTĒ DES SCIENCES 
JURIDIQUES ET POLITIQUES, (Presses Universitaires d’Afrique ed. Tome 6, 2002) at 69. (Hereinafter “Fuashi”). 
10
. Ibid. Per Fuashi, at pages 69-70. 
11
. Oserheimen Osunbor, Critique of the Subtle Distinction in Pre-Incorporation Contracts, (1985) 4 J.P.P.L 9-15. (Hereinafter 
“Osunbor I”). 
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Principal to ratify an Agent’s acts undertaken on the Principal’s behalf, the Principal, at the time of the act was 
performed, must have been in existence either as a natural person or as a juristic person.1 As Fuashi had stated: 
...Common law is reticent to accept the takeover of pre-incorporation contracts by the company 
because of the operation of the rules governing ratification.2 
 
Nigeria, a common law jurisdiction, was not the only common law jurisdiction that was troubled with 
the uncertain status of the pre-incorporation contracts based on the state of the statutory and case law on business 
transactions as received from the old colonial rulers in Kelner v Baxter and Newbourne vs Sensolid Ltd, and 
their progeny of cases.3 The same legal uncertainty also existed in the Francophone countries of West Africa 
until the enactment of the Uniform Act Relating to Commercial Companies and Economic Interest Groups on 
January 1st, 19984 as promulgated by the OHADA5 (i.e., the “UARCCC”).6 South Africa has also attempted, at 
least three (3) statutory amendments towards ameliorating the obstacles posed by Kelner vs Baxter and its 
common law progeny to efficient running of corporations.7 
It is the problems posed by the interface between Agency Law rules and company law that forms the 
fulcrum of this thesis, within the context of statutory amendments. 
III. The Promoter and His Role in Formation of Companies And The Interplay Between Pre-
incorporation Contracts and the Law of Agency Rules. 
 
Pre-incorporation contracts are agreements entered into by a company promoter on behalf of the 
company being promoted prior to the incorporation of the proposed company,8 so it follows that legal issues 
surrounding a pre-incorporation contract will be incomplete without a definition of the identity and roles of the 
promoter who actually executes the contract. Lord Justice Lindley in Lidney & Wigpool Iron Ore Company v. 
Bird,9 had defined the promoter thus:  
“Although not an agent for the company or a trustee for it before its formation, the old familiar  
principles  of  law  of  agency  and  of  trusteeship  have  been  extended  and  very  properly 
extended to meet such cases. It is perfectly well settled that a promoter of a company is 
accountable to it for all monies secretly obtained by him from it just as the relationship of the 
principle and agent or the trustee and cestui que between him and company when the money was 
obtained.”  
 
Statutorily, in Nigeria, a promoter is defined by Section 61 of the CAMA as: 
Any person who undertakes to take part in forming a company with reference to a given project 
and to set it going and who takes the necessary steps to accomplish that purpose, or who, with 
regard to a proposed or newly formed company, undertakes a part in raising capital for it, shall 
prima facie be deemed a promoter of the company: Provided that a person acting in a 
professional capacity for persons engaged in procuring the formation of the company shall not 
thereby be deemed to be promoter.10 
                                                 
1
. See, Fuashi supra  note 24, at 71; See, also, See, generally, G.H.L. FRIDMAN, THE LAW OF AGENCY (1983 ed.) at page 
166. (“Fridman”). 
2
. Ibid. Per Fuashi, at 71. 
3
. See, generally, Urhobo vs Tarka (1976) 1 FNR 208; Shonibare National Investment properties Co. vs Manour, (1963) 
LLR 1; Moukarim Metal Wood Factory Ltd., vs Durojaiye, (1976) 1 ALR Comm. 264; Stephen vs Build Co. Nigeria 
Limited, (1968) 1 All NLR 183; Spiller vs. Paris Skating Rink Co., (1878) 7 Ch.D. 368; Natal Land and Colonization Co. 
Ltd v Pauline Colliery and Development Syndicate [1904] AC 12; Re National Mail-Coach Co. Ltd., Clinton’s Claim, 
[1908] 2 Ch. 515; Re Heresford and South Wales Waggon and Engineering Co., (1876) 2 Ch.D 621; Re Empress 
Engineering Co., (1880) 16 Ch.D. 125; Rover International Ltd. vs Cannon Film Sales Ltd., (No. 3), [1989] 3 All E.R. 432; 
McCullogh vs Fernwood Estate Ltd., (1920) AD 204, at 207-208; Sentrale Kusnsmis Korp (Edms) Bpk vs. NKP 
Kunsmisverspreiders (Edms) Bpk, (1970) 3 SA 342, at page 345. 
4
. The UARCCC is the business law governing business organizations within the Francophone Zone in Africa, which became 
operative on 1st of January 1998. 
5
. OHADA is the acronym for the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, comprising Sixteen (16) 
countries such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, the Comores, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), 
Côte d’Ívoire, Gabon, Republic of Guinea, Republic of Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Chad and 
Togo. The OHADA is known in French as Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires, instituted 
under 17th October 1993 Treaty of Port-Louis. 
6
. See Fuashi, supra note 24, at 69.  
7
. See, Maryke Boonzaier, supra note 6, at pages 12-33. 
8
. M. J. Whincop, "Of Dragons and Horses: Filling Gaps in Pre-incorporation Contracts" (1998) 12 JCL 223-225. 
9
. Lidney & Wigpool Iron Ore Company v. Bird [1866] 33 Ch. D 85 
10
. See also MacAura vs Northern Assurance Company Ltd., [1925] AC 619; Twycross vs Grant, (1877) 2CPD 469; Adeniji 
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Similarly, under Section 423 of the South African Companies Act No. 61 of 1973, a promoter is defined as any 
person who has taken part in the formation or promotion of a company. On the other hand, in the United States, 
Section 2(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, a promoter is defined thus: 
“Promoter” of a company or a proposed company means a person who, acting alone or in concert 
with other persons, is initiating or directing, or has within one year initiated or directed, the 
organization of such company.” 1 
 
Thus, a corporate promoter (also referred to as a "projector") is a person who solicits people to invest money into 
a corporation, usually when it is being formed. While an investment banker, an underwriter, or a stock promoter 
may, wholly or in part, perform the role of a promoter, promoters generally owe a duty of utmost good faith, so 
as to not mislead any potential investors, and disclose all material facts about the company's business. He is a 
person who does the preliminary work incidental to the formation of company.2 
Legal consequences resulting from a promoter’s dealings with third parties on behalf of a future 
corporation are significant,3 because, it is very clear from the point of promoter that he is not the agent of the 
company nor is he doing any authorized work, yet, he is entering into a contract with a third party on behalf of 
non existing principal.4 
The position of a promoter becomes very ambiguous, especially, when the corporation refuses to adopt 
the pre incorporation contract.5 In Nigeria, the status of the pre-incorporation contracts is stated under Section 
72(1)&(2) of the CAMA thus: 
72.    (1)          Any contract or other transaction purporting to be entered into by the company or 
by any person on behalf of the company prior to its formation may be ratified by the company 
after its formation and thereupon the company shall become bound by and entitled to the benefit 
thereof as if it has been in existence at the date of such contract or other transaction and had been 
a party thereto. 
(2)          Prior to ratification by the company, the person who purported to act in the name of or 
on behalf of the company shall, in the absence of express agreement to the contrary, be personally 
bound by the contract or other transaction and entitled to the benefit thereof. 
 
From the above, sub-section (1) of section 72 evinces the following:6 
(1) it gives the new company the discretion of deciding whether to ratify and accept a pre-incorporation 
contract;  
 
(2) it also expunges the distinction in Kelner v Baxter and Newbourne vs Sensolid Ltd, as to how a 
promoter signs a pre-incorporation contract (which is now of no relevance);  
 
(3) it applies to all contracts and transactions executed prior to formation of the company; and 
 
(4) the benefits and liabilities on the pre-incorporation contract fall on the new company after 
ratification.7 
 
In addition, sub-section (2) of section 72 also literally shows that:  
(1) it seeks to protect a bona fide third party who was not aware of the promoter’s lack of authority, by 
providing remedy for the injured third party, who may recoup under the contract from the promoter if, 
after incorporation, the company does not  
ratify the contract;  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
vs Starcola (Nigeria) Ltd., (Suit No. M. 135/70, Unreported High Court, Lagos.), 1 (1972) All N.L.R 52/2 (1972) 1 S.C. 140. 
1
. INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 [AS AMENDED THROUGH P.L. 112-90, APPROVED JANUARY 3, 2012]; 
See, also, Section 30 15 U.S. Code § 80a–2. 
2
. Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218 
3
. See, Prasidh Raj Singh, Promoter & Pre incorporation contract, 1. Electronic copy available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1938065. Last accessed 13 October 2014. 
4
. Ibid. Prasidh Raj Singh. 
5
. Ibid. Prasidh Raj Singh. 
6
. See Agomo, supra note 20 at page 83. 
7
. Curiously, the phrase “adoption” was not used in the legislation. This was the word used in the Nigerian seminal case of in 
Edokpolo vs Sem-Edo Wire Industries Ltd. (1984) N.S.C.C. 553 
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(2) the injured party can also recoup under the contract from the promoter if the company eventually 
does not come into existence; and  
 
(3) it also requires the consent of the third party to any later post-incorporation agreement or resolution 
by the new company, not to ratify which also seeks to absolve the agent from liability.1 
 
As stated earlier, section 72 CAMA arose from the practical obstacles encountered under the old common law 
rule governing pre-incorporation contracts. According to Maryke Boonzaier,2 common law of agency placed an 
obstacle ahead of businessmen who tried to contract with promoters (Agents), and also where the promoters tried 
to contract on behalf of a Principal (the new Company) that does not yet exist in an attempt to obtain benefits for 
that Principal: 
The common law principles from the understanding that a company—prior to incorporation—is 
not yet a legal entity and can therefore not perform juristic acts such as such as the conclusion of 
contracts. In the same vein, no person has the authority to act as an Agent of a company that has 
not yet been established. Where an Agent proceeds to contract on behalf of a non-existing 
Principal, with the expectation that the Principal will ratify the transaction upon incorporation, 
the common law rules of agency will preclude the ratification. These rules determine that a 
Principal, not yet in existence at the time of the transaction, is not competent to ratify and hence 
there can be no representation of such a person. Ratification has a retrospective effect and for this 
reason a person cannot act on behalf of a Principal that does not exist. A company can thus not 
acquire rights nor incur liabilities in this manner.3 
 
The original rationale behind this common law obstacle was based on the strict Law of Agency which demanded 
that the Principal and Agent must have agreed that an agency relationship existed prior to the Agent acting for 
the Principal.4 Thus, in situations where the Agent had acted, on behalf of the Principal, but without authority, 
common law required that the Principal on being made aware of ultra vires acts, must have ratified, adopted and 
accepted the unauthorized conduct of the Agent. Further, such ratification gives validity to the agent’s acts from 
the date of ratification and the act of ratification is also antedated so as to take effect from the time of the 
Agent’s unauthorized conduct.5  
IV. The Position of the Law on Pre-Incorporation Contracts in Nigeria Prior to 1990. 
Prior to 1963, the Nigerian legal system was fashioned after the English case and statutory laws, and so, 
the Nigerian company law, like all other laws, was originally inherited in the aftermath of the late 19th century 
European colonization of Africa. Nigeria was colonized by the Great Britain, and it followed that English 
statutory and case laws were imported into Nigeria.6 As Orojo stated: 
“[Modern statutory company law is] foreign to the customary and indigenous system of laws in 
Nigeria and its history is part of the received English law which has become incorporated into the 
Nigerian legal system.”7 
 
First, there was the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856 that introduced the limited liability company 
and the deed of settlement systems as practiced in the United Kingdom.8 What the British did was to enact 
several company ordinances between 1912 and 1960, when Nigeria regained its independence from colonial 
rule.9 In 1912, the Companies Ordinance that was only applicable to Lagos State, was enacted. The 1912 
Companies Ordinance was largely based on the English Companies (Consolidation) Act of 1908, and this 1912 
Ordinance was extended to the rest of the country in 1917 after the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern 
protectorates of Nigeria in 1914.10 Its objects were: 
                                                 
1
. See Agomo, supra note 20 at page 83. 
2
. See Maryke Boonzaier, supra note 6, at 1. 
3
. Ibid. Per Maryke Boonzaier at pages 1-2. 
4
 See, Fridman supra note 27, at page 73-96; See, also, Agomo, supra note 20, at page 80. 
5
. Ibid Fridman, at 73-96. 
6
. See Orojo, supra note 22, at 16. 
7
. Ibid. 
8
. See Bukola Akinola, A Critical Appraisal of the Doctrine of Corporate personality Under the Nigerian Company Law, NLII 
Workshop Paper No. 002; See also, Orojo, supra note 7, at 17. 
9
. See, generally, BONIFACE U. AHUNWAN, CONTEXTUALISING COMPANY LAWS: A COMPARISON OF THE 
NIGERIAN AND CANADIAN SHAREHOLDERS’ REMEDIES, a Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and 
Research, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements of the Degree of Master of 
Laws, Fall 1998, at Page 3. (Hereinafter “Ahunwan”). 
10
. See, Orojo supra note 22, at pages 18. 
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To provide for the formation of limited companies within the Colony and Protectorate. It is hoped 
thereby to foster the principles of cooperative trading and effort in the country.1 
 
Another Companies Ordinance, which was based on the United Kingdom Companies Ordinance of 
1922, was enacted in 1929, repealing the 1912 Ordinance.2 This continued in force until 1968, when, after 
independence, the Companies Decree of 1968 was promulgated by the then Military Regime of General Yakubu 
Gowon.3 This 1968 Companies Decree was fashioned after the British Companies Act of 1948, and it was 
wholly based on the recommendations of The Jenkins Committee.4 In 1977, the regime of General Olusegun 
Obasanjo had embarked on indigenization promotion, pursuant to which Nigerian ownership in businesses were 
promoted, and this led to the promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1977. (Hereinafter 
referred to as “NIPC”).5  
Both 1968 Companies Act and the NIPC contained provisions that specified enlarged accountability 
and duties of corporate directors and officers. In particular, Part X of the 1968 legislation contained regulations 
that limited the scope of actions that could be taken by the corporate managers. After the end of the military rule 
in 1979, the Companies Act of 1968 became redundant and unsuitable for the Nigerian business terrain, 
principally, because of the foreign flavour contained in the 1968 Companies Decree. The serious defects in the 
1968 Companies Decree, especially, as concerning the corporate contracts, third parties and minority 
shareholders’ rights were echoed by Dr. Boniface Ahunwan thus: 
The 1968 Act did nothing other than re-enact the British Companies Act 1948. Consequently, the 
Act was faulty because it was not enacted within the context of the Nigerian environment. It was 
therefore unable to match the country’s level of development and its aspirations for greater 
economic growth. In Nigeria, because the corporate concept was novel, combined with the 
unsophisticated nature of the shareholders, there has always been the need to give ample 
protection to these shareholders. This is to encourage the growth of the corporation and also the 
national economy. It is also to encourage the inflow of foreign capital which in modern times is 
indispensable to economic development. Although other variables affect business and the 
attraction of foreign shareholders, such as political stability and enforcement of law and order, 
the protection afforded to shareholders is also a major factor.6 
 
Thus, in 1987, the National Workshop on Reform of Nigeria Company Law was set up, under the 
leadership of Honourable Justice Olakunle Orojo (Retired), to fashion a workable legislation for the Nigerian 
business community.7 The result was the Companies and Allied Matters Act, of 1990 (CAMA),8 which came 
into effect in 1990, as an outcome of a National Workshop on Reform of Nigeria Company Law in 1990. The 
Workshop highlighted, among other things, the ineffective minority protection provisions in the 1968 Companies 
Act. In effect, the CAMA’s provisions: 
[E]mphasized greater protection for shareholders by the provision of wider shareholders’ 
remedies. Even though structurally, the Act remains the British memorandum and articles model, 
it also adopted the Canadian approach to shareholders’ remedies by making provision for the 
derivative action, a liberal oppression and unfair prejudice remedies and other personal 
remedies.9 
 
                                                 
1
. See, the Southern Nigeria Gazette Extraordinary No. 8, Vol. 7 of February 5 & 7 1912, page (xii). 
2
. See, generally, Orojo supra note 22, at pages 18-19. 
3
. A Decree that was promulgated by fiat by the General Yakubu Gowon’s military junta. However, after the return to the 
Civilian rule in October 1979, it was re-designated as Companies Act 1968, S.I. 1980, No. 13. 
4
. See, the Preamble to the Companies Act of 1968; See, also, The JENKINS COMMITTEE ON COMPANY LAW. This was 
a Company Law Committee, chaired by Lord Jenkins and formed under the tenure of John Rodgers (Parliamentary Secretary 
to the Board of Trade). It was formed in November 1959 with terms of reference To review and report upon the provisions 
and workings of: the Companies Act 1948; the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958 and Registration of Business 
Names Act 1916. The Report released is known as the JENKINS COMMITTEE ON COMPANY LAW, Journal of the 
Institute of Actuaries (1886-1994) Vol. 89, No. 2 (SEPTEMBER 1963), pp. 105-124 Published by: Cambridge University 
Press. 
5
. Now, known as the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act, Cap N117, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (2004). (Hereinafter 
“NIPC”). 
6
. See Ahunwan, supra note 52, at page 4. 
7
. THE NIGERIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, Working Papers on the Reform of Nigerian Company Law (Vol. 1: 
Review and Recommendations) (Lagos NLRC. 1989). (Hereinafter “NLRC”). 
8
. See, note 1, supra. 
9
. See Ahunwan, supra note 52, at pages 4-5.  
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It must be noted that prior to the CAMA, the 1968 Companies Act did not specifically make any provisions 
regarding pre-incorporation contracts, except in its Article 80 of Table A Schedule I, which contains provisions 
regarding companies which adopted Table A.1 
The 1990 CAMA faced issues arising from pre-incorporation contracts especially where the company is 
never incorporated and the third party wishes to enforce the contract on which he has expended time, energy, 
effort and money against the corporation,2 or the company is incorporated but the directors do not wish to be 
encumbered with the pre-incorporation contracts allegedly entered into on its behalf by the promoter. Further, in 
this regard, Professor Agomo also identified cases where the company may even resolve to accept liability on the 
pre-incorporation contract, but is unable to perform due to lack of funds or being in liquidation process.3  
V. Applicable Pre-1990 English Common Law and Nigerian Judicial Decisions on Pre-Incorporation 
Contracts  
At this juncture, it is apposite to extrapolate on the annals of case law that previously governed the 
status of pre-incorporation contracts as existing prior to 1990 CAMA. The first case that dealt with pre-
incorporation contracts was Kelner v Baxter,4 where Earle, CJ, held that the promoters who had purchased wine 
prior to the incorporation of the corporation would be personally liable as the corporation lacked personality 
prior to its registration. In Kelner v Baxter, three promoters purchased wine from Kelner as agents of the 
company. The company was formed but went into bankruptcy prior to payment for the wine, and in a lawsuit for 
the cost of its winery, Lord Earle held thus: 
If the company had been in existence, the defendant would have agreed as agents, but since the 
company was not in existence, the documents in which the agreement was set out would be 
inoperative unless it was a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. If there is no existing 
principal, such a contract binds the person professing to be agents.5 
 
In addition, Willes, J, opined that: 
 
Ratification can only be...by a person in existence either actually or in contemplation of law.6 
 
Further, the common law attempted to distinguish between situations (a) where the promoters signed as 
“for and on behalf of” the future corporation and (b) where the promoter wrote his own name without indicating 
that he was an agent as occurred in Newbourne vs Sensolid Ltd.7 Unlike Kelner v Baxter, where the agent had 
signed for a disclosed principal and so caught by the Warranty of Authority rule, the court in Newbourne vs 
Sensolid Ltd, held that the contract was a nullity which was not capable of being ratified because Newbourne did 
not disclose any principal and that the party that Seller intended to contract with the purported corporation only, 
and never with the promoters.8 The rule in Newbourne is that since the intent of the third party was to contract 
solely with the corporation, albeit nonexisting, and that the intention was not to contract with the agent, the 
contact was a nullity since there was no meeting of the minds. There was no offeree to the consideration offered 
by the third party, and in addition, there was no consideration by the nonexisting company, i.e., there was a total 
unilateral mistake of facts leading to a null and void contract. In the words of Windeyer, J, in Black vs 
Smallwood,9 
In many cases courts have had to decide whether an agent had, in the particular case, incurred a 
personal liability on a contract in writing made by him on behalf of a principal. And these 
decisions have sometimes turned upon narrow differences in wording.10 
 
Thus, in the Nigerian case of Caligara vs Giovanni Sartori & Co Ltd.,11 the Court followed the ruling in 
Newbourne vs Sensolid Ltd.12 In December 1956, Giovanni had obtained a loan of £800.00 from Caligara by a 
cheque cashed on 24th January 1957, but Giovanni had obtained the loan in the name of the proposed 
                                                 
1
. See Agomo, supra note 20, at page 83. 
2
. H.M. Oglivie, Company Law-Contract-Liability of Persons Purporting to Contract as Agent for Unformed Company: 
Phonogram v. Lane, (1983) UBC Law Rev. 321; See, also, Stephen vs Build Co. Nigeria Limited, (1968) 1 All NLR 183. 
3
. See Agomo, supra note 20, at pages 79-80. 
4
. (1866) L.R.2CP 174 
5
. Ibid. Per Lord Earle, CJ at page 183. 
6
. Ibid. 184. 
7
. (1954) 1 Q.B. 45. 
8
. See Agomo, supra note 20, at page 80. 
9
. (1967-68) 11 CLR 52. 
10
. Ibid. at 61-62. 
11
. (1961) 1 All N.L.R. 555. 
12
. (1954) 1 Q.B. 45. 
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corporation. Honourable Justice Sowemimo, relying on Paragraph 824, Page 425 of Volume 6 of the Halsbury’s 
Laws of England, (3rd edition), held that the loan transaction was a nullity and so rejected the argument that the 
later corporation was liable since Mr. Sartori had not acted as an agent. Further, the court also held that the 
corporation could not ratify the loan, since it had no legal capacity to confer any authority on the borrower: 
As I earlier mentioned at the time the cheque was cashed, the defendant company was not in 
existence and it could not be said to have taken the benefit of this contract. In the result, the 
Plaintiff’s claim must fail. He has his remedy which he can enforce against the proper person.1 
 
The same view was advocated by Honourable Justice Nnamani, JSC in Edokpolo vs Sem-Edo Wire 
Industries Ltd.,2 that: 
It is now a well settled principle of Company Law that a company is not bound by a pre-
incorporation contract being a contract entered into by parties when it was not in existence. No 
one can contract as agent of such a proposed company there being no Principal in existence to 
bind.3 
 
As to whether there can be a novation4 by which the company, after its registration can then enter into a new 
contract, on the same terms as the old contract, the pre-1990 judicial opinions appear to be divergent. In In Re 
Empress Engineering Company,5 Lord Jessel, MR had held thus: 
The contract between the promoters and the so-called agent for the company of course was not a 
contract binding upon the company, for the company had then no existence nor could it become 
binding on the company by ratification, because it has been decided and as it appears to me well 
decided that there cannot in law be an effectual ratification of a contract which could not have 
been made binding on the ratifier as the time it was made because the ratifier was not then in 
existence...it does not follow from that that acts may not e done by the company after its 
formation which make a new contract to the same effect as the old one, but that stands on a 
different principle.6 
 
In Nigeria, in Enahoro vs Bank of West Africa Ltd.,7 plaintiff bank had lent money to the principal 
shareholder. Prior to the incorporation of the company, the loan was transferred to the company, and after 
formation, a resolution was passed authorizing the transfer of indebtedness to the new company. Also, after 
incorporation, the shareholder as the principal officer obtained a second loan on behalf of the company. 
Honourable Justice Lewis, while holding the company liable for the 2nd loan, however, held that the 1st loan 
cannot be enforced against the new company because a subsequent ratification by a company of an agreement 
purporting to be made on its behalf prior to its formation can only be with the assent of the third party to the 
agreement, and in effect, will be a new agreement: 
We do not see that the liability incurred by the second defendant prior to the coming into 
existence of the first defendant, albeit transferred to the loan accounts of the first defendant...and 
no novation was in our view pleaded by the plaintiff, so that the plaintiff cannot now rely upon 
novation...8 
 
Thus, in Nigeria, novation could not be unilaterally effected by the new corporation all by itself, the third party 
must also give his assent until the decision in Edokpolo vs Sem-Edo Wire Industries Ltd.9 Therein, on 27th 
October 1975, Edokpolo had executed a pre-incorporation agreement with SEM Nigerian Holding GHBH and 
Company Hamburg, (a German company) to create Sem-Edo Wire, i.e., that Edokpolo and the German 
Company would own 40% and 60%, respectively in the new Sem-Edo Wire company. The agreement was 
incorporated into the memorandum of the new company. The company was incorporated on 5th December 1975. 
On 27th February 1976, in breach, the new company after formation, allotted part of Edokpolo’s 40% to the 
chairman and the solicitor, despite a post-incorporation adoption of the share allotment agreement by Sem-Edo 
Wire’s Board of Directors, i.e., that a new contract had been created between Edokpolo and Sem-Edo Wire after 
                                                 
1
. Per Honourable Sowemimo, J., in Caligara vs Giovanni Sartori & Co Ltd. (1961) 1 All N.L.R. 555, at page 556 
2
. (1984) N.S.C.C. 553. 
3
. Ibid. at  555. 
4
. Howard vs Patent Ivory Manufacturing Co. Ltd., (1888) 38 Ch.D. 156. 
5
. 16 Ch.D 125. 
6
. Per Lord Jessel, MR at 16 Ch.D 125, page 128; See, also, Kay, J. in Howard vs Patent Ivory Manufacturing Co. Ltd., 
(1888) 38 Ch.D. 156, at page 164; Firgos (Nigeria) Ltd v Zetters (Nigeria) Pools Ltd, (1965) NLR 13. 
7
. (1971) 1 NCLR 180. 
8
. Ibid. Per Lewis, JSC at page 192. 
9
. (1984) N.S.C.C. 553. 
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incorporation on the same terms as the pre-incorporation contract. Upholding the novation, Justice Nnamani, 
JSC, held that there was nothing to prevent the new corporation from ratifying the pre-incorporation after its 
later registration:1 
But there is nothing preventing the company after incorporation from entering into a new 
contract to put into effect the terms of the pre-incorporation contract. This new contract can be in 
express terms or can be implied from the acts of the company after incorporation as well as from 
the minutes of its general meetings and board meetings.2 
 
After examining the pleadings, Justice Nnamani further held that: 
The implication of this is clearly that after incorporation the company...in its meetings entered 
into arrangements similar to those contained in the 1975 agreement.3 
 
Arguably, in Nigeria, based on Edokpolo vs Sem-Edo Wire Industries Ltd., the company by its own post- 
incorporation resolution may unilaterally ratify a pre-incorporation contract. 
VI. The Demand For Statutory Intervention in Resolving the Kelner v Baxter Quagmire. 
 
While the holding in Edokpolo was salutary, by late 20th century, public angst against the rule in 
Kelner vs Baxter and its progeny had become very loud.4 There were various calls for its abrogation and/or 
amendments since it worked injustice and, at the very least, impracticalities. As Yves Guyon had argued, it 
would be unwise and un-businesslike for the company to wait till registration, before the lease, employment, 
engagement of professional services and/or banking activities could take place.5 Further, according to J.H. 
Gross: 
It is rare to hear of such widespread and common opposition against any aspect of English 
Company Law as that against the 100 year old rule in Kelner vs Baxter. It has long been seen that 
while there are many good reasons why one person ought not to be bound by the offices of 
another who acts without title or authority, there are no practical reasons why such acts should 
not be ratified.6 
 
In addition, Professor Agomo’s view was that: 
 
[The rule in Kelner vs Baxter] has been understandably called one of the weakest points of English 
company law, and one which in one’s opinion reduced judges to a sterile role and made an 
automation of them.7 
 
To L.C.B. Gower, the rule is out of touch with reality and with modern requirements. 8  Further, 
Professor Oserheimen Osunbor opined that there was need to avoid: 
The unnecessary expenses incurred in resolving disputes connected with pre-incorporation 
contracts which no longer posed much difficulty in Ghana, England as well as many other 
commonwealth countries.9 
 
It was based on these concerns that the Nigerian Law Reform Commission in its review of the Nigerian 
Company Law recommended a statutory modification of the common law position along the lines of Ghanaian 
Legislation, leading to Section 72 of CAMA.10 
VII. The State of Pre-Incorporation Contracts Under Civil and Statutory Laws Existing in 
Francophone Countries of West-Africa. 
                                                 
1
. Per Nnamani, JSC in (1984) N.S.C.C. 553, at page 561, while relying on Touche vs Metropolitan Railway Warehousing 
Co., (1871) 6 Ch.App. 671.  
2
. Per Nnamani, JSC in (1984) N.S.C.C. 553, at page 561 
3
. Ibid. per Nnamani, JSC, at page 562; See, also, Edwards vs Halliwell, (1950) 2 All ER 1064; Heyting vs Dupont, (1964) 1 
WLR 843; Burland vs Earle, [1902] AC 83 (PC). 
4
. See, Osunbor 1, supra note 26, at 9-15; See, also, Honourable Justice Karibi-Whyte, JSC, Some Reflections on Company 
Law Reform, Nigerian Business Law and Practice Journal, Vol. 1, No. 32 July/Dec. 1988. 
5
. See, Guyon supra note 23, at 165-166. 
6
. See, Gross, supra note 8. 
7
. See Agomo, supra note 20, at page 82. 
8
. L.C.B. Gower, THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW, (6th ed.) at 282. 
9
. Oserheimen Osunbor, Critique of the Subtle Distinction in Pre-Incorporation Contracts, (1985) 4 J.P.P.L 9-15. (Hereinafter 
“Osunbor II”). 
10
. See Agomo, supra note 20, at page 83. 
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Nigeria is surrounded by French-speaking African nations, known as Franco-phone and/or Franc Zone 
countries,1 it is therefore necessary to consider the interrelationship of these countries’ business laws with that of 
Nigeria. While Section 72 of the Nigerian CAMA uses the term “promoters,” the UARCCC uses the term 
“Founder”.2 
In Cameroun, for instance, the part that occupy English section that once formed part of the protectorate 
assigned to the British after the First World War also inherited the rule in Kelner v Baxter.3 Generally, in 
Franco-phone and/or Franc Zone countries, under the Uniform Act Relating to Commercial Companies and 
Economic Interest Groups of January 1st, 1998 (UARCCC), there is a distinction between (a) companies that are 
merely formed and (b) companies that have been formed and incorporated. 4  Thus, under Article 101 of 
UARCCC, a corporation is formed on the date the incorporators subscribe their signatures to the Articles of the 
company. Yet, such a company has no legal personality recognized by law,5 since Article 98 of UARCCC 
provides that a company acquires legal personality when it is registered in the Trade and personal Property 
Credit Register.6 
Further, articles 106-110 of UARCCC state that for a company that has not been incorporated, 
promoters who have entered into pre-incorporation contracts which they intend to be taken over by the company 
after incorporation must inform the members of the company about the existence of such a contract.7 The 
disclosure of pre-incorporation contracts must be done either prior to the signing of the Articles of Association 
where the company must not make public calls for capital or during the statutory meeting of the company where 
the company is the one making the calls for public capital.8  
Under Article 106(2), a Statement of Acts Done and Commitments Made On Behalf of the Company 
Under Formation, stating the pre-incorporation contracts and the potential liabilities of the new company must 
be provided. If the new company is entitled to a Statutory Meeting, a Statement of Acts Done and Commitments 
Entered Into With Third Parties On Behalf of the Company, shall be appended to the Articles and presented to 
the members. If, after this, the members decide to sign the articles and the Statement, the company is deemed to 
have taken over the pre-incorporation contracts and commitments from the date that company is registered in the 
Trade and Personal Property Credit Register.9 
Further acts done and commitments entered into on behalf of the company during formation may also 
be taken over by the company after incorporation,10 once such are approved at the Annual General Meeting of 
shareholders under the conditions laid down by the UARCCC, unless there is a contrary provision in the 
articles.11 The meeting shall be fully informed of the nature and scope of each of the acts and commitments 
being proposed for take-over by the company.12 The persons who enter into such acts and commitments shall not 
vote and their votes shall not be taken into account in determining the quorum and majority.13  
As to companies that are entitled to a statutory meeting, the take-over of pre-incorporation acts and 
commitments shall be the subject of a special resolution taken during the statutory meeting under the conditions 
laid down by the UARCCC.14  Thus, concerning the fate of contracts entered into on behalf of a Franco-
phone/Franc Zone company before incorporation under UARCCC, pre-incorporation contract entered into on 
behalf of a company at this stage could be taken over by the company either through the operation of a contract 
of agency or by way of ratification.15  As stated by Fuashi, the application of the contract of agency rule 
expresses the creation of an agency relationship based on agreement generally before the agency is executed. 
Thus, from the date of signature on the Articles of Association, company management is taken over from 
                                                 
1
. During the 1880’s scramble for Africa and as a result of the defeat of Germany after the 1st World War, Nigeria became 
enclosed by countries (Togo, Republic of Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroon) that were previously colonized by France and 
the German-colonized  nations (Togo and Upper-Cameroun) that were ceded to France by the League of Nations in 1919.  
2
. See Articles 73 and 102 of UARCCC. To, Fuashi, this is a misnomer, because these promoters referred at founders may not 
subscribe to memorandum and articles of association of the corporation upon the registration of the company. See, Fuashi, 
supra note..., at page 69, fn 3. 
3
. Chapter 37, of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (1958). 
4
. See, Fuashi, supra note 24, at page 73. 
5
. Ibid per Fuashi, at pages 73-74. 
6
. See Uniform Act Relating to the General Commercial Law, Article 20, et seq. 
7
.  See, UARCCC Article 106. 
8
. See, UARCCC Article 106; See, Fuashi, supra note..., at page 74. 
9
. See, UARCCC Article 107. 
10
. See, UARCCC Article 108. 
11
 See, Fuashi, supra note 24, at pages 74-75. 
12
. Ibid per Fuashi, at page 75. 
13
. Ibid per Fuashi. 
14
. See Article 410 of the UARCCC; See, also, Fuashi, supra note 24, at page 75. 
15
. Ibid per Fuashi 
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founders by company executives under the Dirigeants sociaux rule, designated by shareholders.1 Shareholders 
may in the Articles of Association or in a separate instrument, grant powers to one or more of the company 
executives, depending on the case to enter into commitments on behalf of the company which though fully 
formed, has not yet been entered into the Trade and Personal Property Credit Register, provided that such 
commitments are defined and their scope are specified in the terms oif reference.2  
This creates a Contractual Agency relationship between the shareholders (Principal) and the 
Company Executives (Agents). Acts which fall within the terms of reference granted by the 
shareholders will bind the shareholders viz-a-viz the third parties and the takeover of their acts is 
by simple registration of the company in the Trade and Personal Property Credit Register.3 
 
However, where the company executives involve themselves in acts that are beyond the scope of the terms of 
reference, Article 112 of the UARCCC also provides for the possibility of take-over by ratification.4 Thus, there 
can be take-over of pre-incorporation contracts by ratification, which occurs where acts that the company 
executives carry beyond the scope of their terms of reference or are unrelated to such terms may still be taken 
over by the company under Article 112 of the UARCCC. Yet, ratification can only take place where such has 
been approved by an ordinary meeting of shareholders under the conditions laid down by the UARCCC.5 In 
effect, the shareholders are thus the ratifying authority under the banner of the ordinary meeting.6 However, the 
shareholders involved in such acts shall not be taken into account for determining the quorum and the majority.7 
The above statutory intervention in the Franco-phone countries is salutary and welcome: 
With the possibility of take-over of pre-incorporation contracts provided for by the Uniform Act, 
once a contract has been taken over by a duly constituted and registered company, it is 
considered that the company itself entered into the contract from the origin. This discharges the 
promoter from any liability on the contract. The promoter will however be unlimitedly liable in 
situations where the company does not take-over the contract. 
 
Given the indispensability of certain pre-incorporation contracts, the attitude of the Uniform Act 
towards these contracts can aptly be described as pragmatic, and goes a long way to encourage 
company floatation... 
 
By allowing the company the possibility to choose those pre-incorporation contracts it can take-
over and those to reject, the Uniform Act adopts a more pragmatic attitude towards promoters 
and these contracts. This is an area of the law in which the Common Law should jettison legal 
parochialism and embrace stance like that of the Uniform Act over same. In fact, it is one of the 
strong points of the Uniform Act, and undoubtedly can foster economic development by 
facilitating the creation of companies.8 
In sum, under the UARRC, the shareholders, upon full disclosure, have the option of ratifying or to refuse the 
pre-incorporation contracts. However, in deciding whether to ratify or not, interested shareholders must not vote 
at the meeting 
VIII. Pre-Incorporation Contracts Under Section 35(1) of Malaysia Companies Act 1965. 
 
The legal position of pre-incorporation contracts is different in English common law from Malaysian 
company law statute, since under Kelner vs Baxter rule, pre-incorporation contracts are invalid and cannot be 
ratified and adopt the benefits of the contract which has been made on its behalf. 9  However, statutory 
amendments under Malaysia Companies Act 1965 creates a legal presumption that the legal status of pre-
incorporation contracts is that it is invalid, with the exception that it can be ratified by virtue of Section 35(1) of 
the Malaysia Companies Act 1965: 
“Any contract or other transaction purporting to be entered into by a company prior to its 
formation or by any person on behalf of a company prior to its formation may be ratified by the 
company after its formation and thereupon the company shall become bound by and entitled to 
                                                 
1
. Ibid per Fuashi 
2
. See Article 111 of the UARCCC; See, also, Fuashi, supra note 24, at page 75. 
3
. Ibid per Fuashi. 
4
. Ibid per Fuashi, at page 76. 
5
. Ibid per Fuashi. 
6
. Ibid per Fuashi. 
7
. Ibid per Fuashi. 
8
. Ibid per Fuashi. 
9
. See, Mastura Hashim, Pre-incorporation contract - Company Law. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/3336504/Pre-
incorporation_contract_-_Company_Law. Last accessed on 10th October, 2014. 
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the benefit thereof as if it had been in existence at the at date of the contract or other transaction 
and had been a party thereto.” 
 
While outsiders may suffer total negative effects under English common law as such contracts cannot be ratified 
and are unenforceable before the courts,1 under Malaysia company law, the outsiders are secured when they 
make contracts with a company in good faith, because pre-incorporation can be ratified, and after ratification by 
the Board of Directors,2 the company becomes legally bound by the contract.3 
So, outsiders can claim the price of the goods. In case of the contract not been approved by directors, 
outsiders have the right to sue the promoters for personal liability for breach of the contract.4 
 
In the Malaysian case of Cosmic Insurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Khoo Chiang Poh, 5  before the company’s 
incorporation as a legal entity, Mr. Khoo Chiang Poh was appointed as the managing director to the company in 
August 1971 in a pre-incorporation contract between Poh and the remaining 11 promoters acting as agents for 
Cosmic. The appointment stated:  
“Mr. Khoo Chiang Poh shall be the managing director for life unless he resigns, dies, or commit an 
offence under the Companies Act or is prohibited to become a director under the Companies Act for 
any offences.”  
 
Thereafter, on 26th of September 1971, Cosmic was incorporated and there was a ratification of the appointment 
contract with a slight modification to include the following: 
“Resolved that Mr. Khoo Chiang Poh be appointed Managing Director and hold office for life in 
accordance to the Articles and Memorandum of Association and is responsible to the Board of 
Director.” 
 
The court upheld the ratification of the pre-incorporation contract because the subsequent modified ratification 
did not affect or invalidate the appointment of Kooh as a director. Further, Malaysian company law, allowed a 
pre-incorporation contract to be ratified and validated even the word or term in the ratification is different from 
the previous term.6 
Also, in Ahmad bin Salleh & Ors v. Rawang Hills Resort Sdn Bhd,7 plaintiffs had entered into a 
contract to sell a piece of land to defendants, and part of the purchase price had been received by plaintiffs. 
Further, plaintiffs also granted irrevocable powers of attorney to defendants for the purpose of partitioning the 
said land representing the ownership between plaintiffs’ and defendants’. The agreement mentioned that the 
process will be settled within six months from the date of the contract or the date the issuance of related 
document for partitioning process. During litigation, plaintiffs alleged that defendants had breached the 
agreement by, inter alia, not being incorporated when the sale and purchase agreement was entered into. The 
court dismissed plaintiffs’ claim even though by the time the first sale and purchase agreement was executed, 
defendants were not in existence, however, the agreements were subsequently ratified under s 35 of Companies 
Acts 1965.8 
It seems that the Nigerian case of Edokpolo vs Sem-Edo Wire Industries Ltd., and the Malaysian case 
of Cosmic Insurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Khoo Chiang Poh, are on all fours, since the corporation is allowed to 
unilaterally ratify a modified pre-incorporation contract. 
IX. Pre-Incorporation Contracts Under Section 47 of the Zimbabwean Companies Act (2006).9 
 
Zimbabwe corporate law allows for two major exceptions to the common law rule in Kelner vs Baxter, 
i.e., the concept of the stipulatio alteri and Section 47 of the Companies Act. Thus, in Watson v Gilson 
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. Ibid per Hashim at 1. 
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. See, Hashim supra note 117, at 1. 
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. Ibid. per Hashim at 1. 
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. [1981] MLJ 61. (Privy Council before Lord Edmund-Davies, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, Lord Searman, Lord Roskill & 
Sir Garfiel Barwick, on July 10th & October 15th,1980 [Privy Council Appeal No. 13 of 1979] 
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. This case was fully discussed by Mastura Hashim, supra note 117. 
7
. [1995] 3 MLJ 211 HIGH COURT (SHAH ALAM) – SUIT NO 22-140-94, before Honourable JAMES FOONG J on 
August 3rd, 1995. 
8
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9
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Enterprises & Ors,1 Honourable Justice Gillespie had to consider the rights of a person who contracts on behalf 
of a company not yet incorporated. Therein, the court also examined the position of the company both at 
common law and under the Zimbabwean Companies Act.  Justice Gillespie stated thus: 
“Thus where a person purports to contract as agent for a company which is not as yet formed, the 
company upon its incorporation cannot at common law (leaving aside for the moment the relevant 
provisions of the Companies Act) purport to ratify that contract. It could only enjoy the benefits of 
that contract were it to enter into a new contract itself with the other party.”2 
 
Thus, applicable in Zimbabwe is the Roman Dutch law recognizing the concept of the stipulatio alteri by which 
– 
‘where the persons have entered into a contract for the benefit of a third, the latter may, before the 
promise has been revoked, accept it and thus acquire a right of action...’3 
 
Under the concept of the stipulatio  alteri, the third party may accept the benefit even if it did not exist when the 
promise was made, where such a third party, particularly a company not incorporated at the time of the 
agreement, purports to ratify or adopt the contract made for its benefit.  
In addition, Section 47 of the 2006 Companies Act now provides as follows:  
“Any contract made in writing by a person professing to act as agent or trustee for a company not yet 
formed, incorporated or registered shall be capable of being ratified or adopted by or otherwise made 
binding upon and enforceable by such company after it has been duly registered as if it had been 
duly formed, incorporated and registered at the time when the contract was made if- 
 
(a)        the memorandum on its registration contains as one of the objects of such company 
the adoption or ratification or the acquisition of rights and obligations in respect of such 
contract; and 
(b)        the contract or a certified copy thereof is delivered to the Registrar simultaneously 
with the delivery of the memorandum in terms of section twenty-one.” 
 
The statutory provisions in Section 47 have received attention from the learned authors: Jericho Nkala and 
Timothy Joseph Nyapadi,4 and the view of the learned authors is that, in Zimbabwe, a company can adopt 
contracts made on its behalf before incorporation provided that it (the company) meets the following five (5) 
conditions- viz;  
a. that the contract is in writing;  
b. the person making the contract on behalf of the company to be formed, irrespective of how he 
describes himself must at least profess to act as agent for the company;  
c. the memorandum and articles of association must contain at the time of incorporation the contract 
as one of its objects;  
d. the contract must be delivered to the registrar simultaneously with the memorandum and articles of 
association and  
e. the contract must be legally enforceable.5 
 
It must be noted that Nkala & Nyapadi have similarly pointed out that the newly formed company may refuse to 
be bound by the contract.6 
Yet, in Gray v Registrar of Deeds,7 on 2nd September 2007, Gray, a trustee for a company about to be 
formed entered into an agreement with one Marie Louise Morris in respect of the sale of an immovable property 
belonging to Morris. The sale was successfully concluded by the parties thereto. The purchaser of the property 
was not specifically identified and was referred to as Ian Spence Gray acting as trustee for a company about to 
be formed. The company was incorporated on 8th November 2007.  On 19th March 2008, the company attempted 
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. Jericho Nkala and Timothy Joseph Nyapadi, Nkala & Nyapadi on Company Law in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Distance 
Education College (ZDECO) Publishing House, 1995 , at 59-63. (Hereinafter “Nkala & Nyapadi”). 
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. Ibid. Per Nkala & Nyapadi.  
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. Ibid. Per Nkala & Nyapadi, at 59-63. 
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. See Gray and Another v Registrar of Deeds, Judgment of 30th June, 2010, at page 6. 
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. Gray and Another v Registrar of Deeds, Case No: HC 2537/09 Media Neutral Citation: [2010] ZWHHC 114 (Judgment 
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to register the documents of transfer, but the documents were returned with an instruction that the applicant 
comply with section 47 of the Zimbabwean Companies Act of 2006.  The court in Gray v Registrar of Deeds 
first noted that Zimbabwean courts have accepted that at common law the promoters of a company prior to 
incorporation could individually enter into a contract for the benefit of such company by relying on Graphics 
Africa (Zimbabwe) (Pvt) Ltd v Rank Xerox Ltd,1 where Honourable Justice Adam, had unequivocally stated 
that: 
“At common law, it is clear that the promoters of a company prior to incorporation could 
individually enter into a contract for the benefit of such company to be formed and on its 
incorporation the newly formed company could adopt the contract. Sentrale Kunssmis Korporasie 
(Edms) Bpk v NKP 1970 (3) SA 367”2 
 
The court in Gray v Registrar of Deeds therefore held that the documents were registrable based on stipulatio 
alteri rule, since the trustee had expressly acted for the interest of the future corporation which later adopted and 
ratified the purchase. 
Further, the court Gray v Registrar of Deeds also recognized that Nyapadi and Nkala had stated that 
where the company has not complied with provisions of the Companies Act, the first alternative would be to 
invoke the common law rules in Kelner vs Baxter which they refer to as being very complicated.3 Therefore, the 
court further noted that Nkala & Nyapadi have accepted that the company can under the concept of a stipulatio 
alteri ratified the pre-incorporation contract.4 In sum, the court in Gray v Registrar of Deeds, held that: 
This is not the situation in this case as the company is the prime mover for the acceptance and 
ratification of the contract concluded on its behalf. In casu the requirements of s 47 have not been 
complied and it falls for this court to decide if the contract is a stipulatio alteri and if so whether or 
not it can be adopted and ratified by the company. I did not understand the respondent to dispute the 
contention by the applicants that the contract negotiated by the first applicant was a stipulatio alteri. 
I take the view therefore that the nature of the contract has been accepted. In the premises I cannot 
find a reason why the first applicant cannot enforce the contract. This in my view includes the 
registration of title in the cause of the contract itself.5 
 
VIII. Status of Pre-Incorporation Contracts Before and Under Section 21 of the South African 
Companies Act No 71 of 2008 
 
In South Africa, pre-incorporation contracts are now governed by Section 21 of the South African 
Companies Act No 71 of 2008, which was signed into law on 8th April, 2009 but which came into operation in 
April 2011. Jettisoning the common law rule in Kelner vs Baxter, South Africa has introduced several major 
amendments as follows:  
(a) Section 71 of the Companies Act No. 46 of 1926,  
(b) Section 35 of the Companies Act No. 61 of 1973 and 
(c) Section 21 of the Companies Act, No. 71 of 2008. 
A review of the very first South African statutory intervention, i.e., Section 71 of the 1926 South African 
Companies Act, appeared to have given a company the power to ratify preliminary contracts made by the 
promoter: 
Any contract made in writing by a person professing to act as agent or trustee for a company not 
yet formed, incorporated or registered shall be capable of being ratified or adopted by or 
otherwise made binding upon and enforceable by such company after it has been duly registered 
as if it had been duly formed, incorporated and registered, at the time when the contract was 
made, and such contract had been made without its authority. 
 
Provided that the memorandum contains as one of the objects of such company the adoption or 
ratification of or the acquisition of rights and obligations in respect of such contract and that ... [a 
copy of such] contract has been lodged with the Registrar together with the application for 
registration of the company.  
 
                                                 
1
. 1989 (2) ZLR 292(H). 
2
.1989 (2) ZLR 292 (H), at 301F 
3
. See Gray and Another v Registrar of Deeds, Judgment of 30th June, 2010, at pages 5-6. 
4
. Ibid. at page 6. 
5
. Ibid. 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.31, 2014 
 
110 
Clearly, the 1926 amendment provided all the requirements for "adoption" of a preliminary contract, and nothing 
more was required than the strict compliance with its terms.1 Thus, South African section radically altered the 
doctrine of Kelner v. Baxter in its bearing upon pre-incorporation contracts, by exonerating the promoter 
irrespective of whether the company was or was not in existence at the time of the contract, excluding warranty 
of authority if the other party knew at the time of the contract that he had no authority.2 
 In terms of Section 71 of the 1926 Act, a pre-incorporation contract can effectively be ratified/adopted 
by a company, after its incorporation, provided the following requirements are met: 
a. the contract is in writing; 
b. the person who concluded the contract professed to act as agent or trustee for a company not 
yet incorporated; 
c. the memorandum of association of the company contained as an object of the company the 
adoption of or the acquisition of rights and obligations of such contract; and 
d. a copy of such contract has been lodged with the Registrar together with the application for 
registration of the company.3 
 
It appears that the most pertinent requirement appears to be that the memorandum of the company contain as one 
of the objects, the adoption or ratification of the contract by the company. According to Professor Ncube, this 
serves as an important protection to outsiders (potential creditors and investors) who may wish to extend credit 
to or invest in the company.4  
Outsiders who intend to do business with a particular company can now determine its pre-
incorporation commercial activities by examining the company’s memorandum. Subsequently, 
this information will enable them to make informed decisions with regards to that specific 
company.5 
 
Maryke Boonzaier, has submitted that section 71 raises an important questions:6  
 
a. Whether it is necessary for the memorandum to contain the required object at the time of the company’s 
registration, or would it be acceptable if the object is only absorbed into the memorandum after the 
registration of the company.  
 
b. Is it possible to remedy the defect by altering the company’s object clause after its incorporation?7 
 
Yet, it appears according to the section 71’s plain language, all that was required was that the memorandum must 
contain that object at the time of the ratification or adoption of the contact, which meant after the company’s 
registration.8 
 Further the time and mode of ratification as conceived under Section 71 were also problematic because 
section 71 neither explicitly nor impliedly prescribed a specific time period during which the company would be 
compelled to ratify or adopt the contract. Also, it did not make provision for the manner of adoption of the 
contact. Thus, where a contract did not expressly stipulate the time and manner of ratification, there was a big 
lacuna.9 
 Finally, in attempting to shield the promoter from personal liability, section 71 appeared to leave the 
third party exposed to losses because section 71 did not make provision for the promoter’s liability during the 
interim period—i.e., the time period between the time of execution of the pre-incorporation contract and the time 
of ratification of the contract by the company. Second, section 71 did not provide protection for the third party, 
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either where the proposed company was never incorporated or where the new company did not ratify the contract 
after incorporation.1 
Between 1926 and 1973, the state of the law in South Africa was as follows: 
(1) If the promoter acts only as an agent, he is not personally liable on the contract. 
 
(2) Where it seems from the facts of the case that the promoter did not act merely as agent, but 
contracted personally, albeit as a trustee, or ostensibly for the benefit of the company, he is 
himself liable on the contract and can sue on it in his own name.2 The promoter is released from 
his personal liability after the company has confirmed the preliminary contract.  
 
(3) If the conditions of section 71 are complied with, the company may ratify pre-incorporation 
contracts. 
 
(4) Even where the requirements of section 71 have not been complied with, it seems that the rules 
of Roman-Dutch law might still apply (despite the section), so that the company can adopt the 
preliminary contracts where the promoter contracted on its behalf.3 
 
Earlier on, in McCullough v Fernwood Estate, 4  the Appellate Division of South Africa, while 
upholding the applicability of Kelner vs Baxter rule in South Africa also upheld the stipulatio alteri rule as an 
exception. Thus, Roman-Dutch law rule that an agreement for the benefit of a third party allows the promoter to 
contract independently for the benefit of the future company, not necessarily in the capacity of an agent, and so, 
the contract when duly accepted by the company for whose benefit it was created becomes fully enforceable.5  
Further, section 50 of the South Africa Companies Act No. 46 of 1952,6 made some amendments by 
adding the following words: 
“...and that a copy of such contract, has been lodged with the Registrar together with the application 
for registration of the company.” 
 
In addition, in 1963, section 9 of the South Africa Companies Act No. 14 of 1963,7 also made some amendments 
by adding the following words: 
“...and that two copies of such contract, one of which shall be certified by a notary public or by a 
subscriber to the memorandum, have been lodged with the Registrar together with the application for 
registration of the company.” 
 
Thus, according to Maryke Boonzaier, 
In light of the experience gained since 1926 about the operation of Section 71, the legislature might 
have thought it essential that, before the adoption or ratification of such a contract by the company, a 
copy of it (and after 1963, a certified copy of it) should be made available in the Companies Registry 
for any interested person to inspect or obtain a copy. The registry would thus be an alternative place 
for inspection and place moreover where a copy of the contract could be obtained.8 
 
In 1963, the South African government inaugurated the Van Wyk de Vries Commission to examine the 1926 
Companies Act and to consolidate all the amendments and propose reforms. The Van Wyk de Vries 
recommendations and report9 were enacted as the 1973 Companies Act. The amended law in Section 35 of the 
1973 Companies Act provided thus: 
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Any contract made in writing by a person professing to act as agent or trustee for a company not yet 
incorporated shall be capable of being ratified or adopted by or otherwise made binding upon and 
enforceable by such company after it has been duly incorporated as if it had been duly incorporated 
at the time when the contract was made and such contract had been made without its authority: 
 
Provided that the memorandum on its registration contains as an object of such company the 
ratification or adoption of or the acquisition of rights and obligations in respect of such contract, and 
that two copies of such contract, one of which shall be certified by a notary public, have been lodged 
with the Registrar together with the lodgement for registration of the memorandum and articles of 
the company. 
 
Despite this amendment, Maryke Boonzaier had noted that 
It is evident that Section 35 does not reflect significant modifications made to its predecessor 
(Section 71 of the 1926-Act). Trivial changes such as the words ‘on its registration’ were inserted 
in section 35 of the 1973-Act,...These words were included in the section to prevent subsequent 
insertion of the object into the company’s memorandum after its registration. The question that 
arose in the Sentrale Kunsmis case with regards to the exact time when the object must be 
absorbed into the memorandum has therefore been remedied by Section 35.1 
 
The amendments in the Companies Act, No. 71 of 2008 started with a definition of a pre-incorporation contract 
in Section 1: 
“an agreement entered into before the incorporation of a company by a person who purports to 
act in the name of, or on behalf of, the company, with the intention or understanding that the 
company will be incorporated, and will be thereafter be bound by the agreement.” 
 
Section 21 of the Companies Act, No. 71 of 2008 dealing with Pre-incorporation contracts now provides thus: 
21. Pre-incorporation contracts 
 
(1) A person may enter into a written agreement in the name of, or purport to act in the name of, 
or on behalf of, an entity that is contemplated to be incorporated in terms of this Act, but does not 
yet exist at the time. 
(2) A person who does anything contemplated in subsection (1) is jointly and severally liable with 
any other such person for liabilities created as provided for in the pre-incorporation contract 
while so acting, if- 
(a) the contemplated entity is not subsequently incorporated; or  
(b) after being incorporated, the company rejects any part of such an agreement or 
action. 
(3) If, after its incorporation, a company enters into an agreement on the same terms as, or in 
substitution for, an agreement contemplated in subsection (1), the liability of a person under 
subsection (2) in respect of the substituted agreement is discharged. 
(4) Within three months after the date on which a company was incorporated the board of that 
company may completely, partially or conditionally ratify or reject any pre-incorporation 
contract or other action purported to have been made or done in its name or on its behalf, as 
contemplated in subsection (1). 
(5) If, within three months after the date on which a company was incorporated, the board has 
neither ratified nor rejected a particular pre-incorporation contract, or other action purported to 
have been made or done in the name of the company, or on its behalf, as contemplated in 
subsection (1), the company will be regarded to have ratified that agreement or action. 
(6) To the extent that a pre-incorporation contract or action has been ratified or regarded to have 
been ratified in terms of subsection (5)- 
(a) the agreement is as enforceable against the company as if the company had been a 
party to the agreement when it was made; and 
(b) the liability of a person under subsection (2) in respect of the ratified agreement or 
action is discharged. 
(7) If a company rejects an agreement or action contemplated in subsection (1), a person who 
bears any liability in terms of subsection (2) for that rejected agreement or action may assert a 
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claim against the company for any benefit it has received, or is entitled to receive, in terms of the 
agreement or action. 
 
As can be seen above, the main criticisms of Section 35 of 1973 Companies Act were that (a) it failed to provide 
for promoter liability and (b) it also failed to provide sufficient third party protection.1 Thus, Section 21 of 2008 
Companies Act sought to address these issues by: 
“...firstly inserting provisions that stipulates that any person who enters into a pre-incorporation 
contract, in the name of, or on behalf of an entity that is not yet incorporated, is jointly and 
severally liable for liabilities created in the pre-incorporation contract, if the contemplated entity 
is not subsequently incorporated or after being incorporated, the company rejects any part of 
that agreement. The promoter will therefore be personally liable in the above circumstances.”2 
 
The 2008 amendment also made provision for the specific period within which the companies are to decide 
whether or not to ratify and adopt the pre-incorporation contract: 
(4) Within three months after the date on which a company was incorporated the board of that 
company may completely, partially or conditionally ratify or reject any pre-incorporation 
contract or other action purported to have been made or done in its name or on its behalf, as 
contemplated in subsection (1). 
 
In Maryke Boonzaier’s opinion,  
 
This provision is in the interests of both third parties and companies. It affords the company a 
fair amount of time in which to apply its attention and reach a decision with regards to the pre-
incorporation contract before liability is imposed on it. In the same vein, third parties will only 
have to wait a maximum of three months for the company’s decision in this regard.3 
 
Further, section 21(5) provides for deemed/implied ratification after three months: 
(5) If, within three months after the date on which a company was incorporated, the board has 
neither ratified nor rejected a particular pre-incorporation contract, or other action purported to 
have been made or done in the name of the company, or on its behalf, as contemplated in 
subsection (1), the company will be regarded to have ratified that agreement or action. 
 
In addition, the old section 35 of the 1973 Companies Act that required the lodging of the pre-incorporation 
contract with the Registrar robs the company and its business partners of confidentiality. Section 21 of 2008 Act 
has abrogated this requirement:  
The requirement to lodge copies of the pre-incorporation contract was...detrimental to companies, 
because it robbed companies and their contractual partners of confidentiality of their agreements, 
and possibly exposed them to unfair practices such as undercutting by competitors.4 
 
The decision to remove the lodging of pre-incorporation requirement was necessary because he company’s 
privacy in its pre-incorporation contracts outweighs protection to third parties.5 
 Finally, if the company, after taking the benefit of the pre-incorporation contract, can be sued for the 
accrued benefit should it decide not to ratify the contract: 
(7) If a company rejects an agreement or action contemplated in subsection (1), a person who 
bears any liability in terms of subsection (2) for that rejected agreement or action may assert a 
claim against the company for any benefit it has received, or is entitled to receive, in terms of the 
agreement or action. 
 
IX. Reform of Pre-Incorporation Contracts Rule in Canada 
Like all common law countries, the Canadian legal system also experienced the stringent effect of the 
rule in Kelner vs Baxter. Reforms of the corporation law commenced in Ontario, i.e., the commercial and 
business capital of Canada, when a Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly was appointed in June 1965 
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(hereinafter "the Lawrence Committee").1 The Select Committee submitted its report in 19672 (hereinafter "the 
Lawrence Report"), and this formed the basis of the Ontario Business Corporations Act of 1968, which in turn 
was revised and modified as Ontario Business Corporations Act of 1970 (Hereinafter "the OBCA").3 On this 
development, Bruce Welling4 commented that: 
The 1970s saw the most important and widespread wave of reform in Canadian corporate 
history. It all began when Ontario, Canada's most populous, most industrially and commercially 
active province completely reformed its corporate law. The ancient and out-moded letters patent 
was discarded. The English model, which was 125 years old by then, was rejected as being 
outdated as well. An entirely new type of corporate constitution was adopted, primarily drawn 
from the New York statute.”5 
 
The Lawrence Report clarified and simplified the common law position on pre-incorporation contracts.6 This, in 
turn, led to the reform of corporation laws in most Canadian Provinces.7 Further, in July 1973, following the 
apparent success of the OBCA, and further to the work of the Task Force on Corporate Law8 (hereinafter "the 
Dickerson Committee"), a report (hereinafter "the Dickerson Report'') was released which led to the I975 
enactment of the Canada Business Corporation Act (hereinafter "the CBCA").9 Similarly in 1980, the Alberta 
Institute of Law Research and Reform's report10 on the reform of corporation law led to the enactment of the 
Alberta Business Corporations Act ("ABCA").11' 
In 1967, the Lawrence Committee, after reviewing the Ontario Business Corporations Act (O.B.CA.), 
recommended that a corporation should have the option to adopt pre-incorporation contracts, and that until the 
corporation adopts the contract, the promoter should be liable.12 According to Lawrence Report 
Section 5. Pre-incorporation Contracts.13  
 
...The Committee recommends, however, that the so-called rule in Kelner v. Baxter should be 
repealed in that the Ontario Act should provide that a company may by its unilateral act, whether 
express or implied, be permitted to adopt and therefore take the benefit and assume the liabilities 
of a contract made in its name or on its behalf prior to incorporation.  
 
The promoters should cease to be liable under any contract so adopted by a company. Pursuant 
to these rules it would follow that promoters would bear the risk of non-adoption of pre-
incorporation contracts — a risk which is properly inherent in the role of promoter. Companies, 
on their part, would be free to assume the benefits of pre-incorporation contracts made on their 
behalf. The Act should provide that in cases where the contract is not adopted by the company, 
the company should be required to restore to the promoters, in specie or otherwise, any benefit 
acquired by the company under the pre-incorporation contract not adopted after incorporation.  
 
1.5.8. These recommendations, however, do not fully resolve the difficulties arising in pre-
incorporation contract situations. Circumstances could exist, it seemed to the Committee, in 
which a company should not be permitted, by non-adoption, to avoid obligations under pre-
incorporation contracts made on its behalf and, conversely, the promoters should not, in some 
circumstances, be freed from liability because the company adopts the contract. For example, if 
the promoters in fact become the sole or dominant shareholders and directors of the company on 
                                                 
1
. Lawrence Committee’s Interim Report of the Select Committee on Company Law, (Toronto: Ontario’s Queen’s Printer, 
1967) 
2
. Ibid. 
3
. Ontario Business Corporations Act. R. S.O. 1970, c. 53. 
4
. See Bruce Welling, Corporate Law in Canada: The Governing Principles, 2nd. ed., (Toronto: Butterworths, 1995). 
5
. Ibid. Per Bruce Welling, at 47. 
6
. See Prasidh Raj Singh, supra note 39, at 4. 
7
. See Ivan R Feltham, Q.C. & William R. Rauenbusch, "Directors' and Officers' Liabilities in Canada" (1975-76) 1 Can. Bus. 
L. J. at 32 1-323. 
8
. R.W.V. Dickerson, J.L. Howard, & L. Getz, Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada (the Dickerson 
Report) (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971). 
9
.  The Canada Business Corporations .4ct, (the CBC A) R. S.C . 1 974-7 5-76 (Can), c. 3 3. (Now amended as the Canada 
Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-44.) 
10
.  Alberta Institute of Law Research and Reform (now Alberta Law Reform Commission)'s Proposals for a New Alberta 
Business Corporations Act Vol. 1 (Edmonton: ILRR, 1980). 
11
. The Business Corporations Act, S.A., 198 1, c B- 1 5. 
12
. See, Section 20 of the O.B.C.A.1970 
13
. See, Section 5 (Pre-incorporation Contracts) in Lawrence Report supra note 163. 
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whose behalf a pre-incorporation contract was entered into, should the contracting party not 
have the right to enforce contractual liability against either the company or the promoters as the 
contracting party may elect? We therefore recommend that the Act be amended to include a 
provision to the effect that a contracting party may make an application to a judge of the High 
Court of Ontario designated by the Chief Justice of the High Court for an order that the 
promoters and the company will be jointly and severally liable under a pre-incorporation 
contract if, under the circumstances, it is just and equitable in the interests of the contracting 
party for such liability to be imposed.  
 
To a large extent, the Lawrence Committee adopted the holding of Justice Shake in ndianapolis Blueprint & 
Manufacturing Co. v. Kennedy et al1 thus:  
"Manifestly no formal resolution of a board of directors is required to effect a ratification; yet 
something more is demanded than a mere  acceptance of benefits which the corporation has no 
power to reject without uncreating itself. We believe the rule applicable may be more clearly 
stated as follows: A corporation may, in the absence of a charter or statutory provisions to the 
contrary, make a promoters' contract its own in the same manner that it might itself enter into a 
contract of a similar nature as one of the original contracting parties...This pre-supposes that 
there may be an implied ratification under some situations..." 2 
 
The Dickerson Committee, considered several law reform committees’ reports globally,3 and thereafter 
drafted the 1975 amendments to the C.B.C.A., which improved upon the 1970 amendments to the O.B.C.A. 
First, it noted that: 
17. We would include in this category incorporation by designating number. The idea is 
scarcely profound but it should be useful. The validity of pre-incorporation contracts is a simple 
and long-overdue reform which expedites corporate promotion and removes a trap into which the 
unwary often fall....4 
 
The Dickerson Committee decided to introduce a new Section 2.10 into the OBCA 
 
68. Section 2.10 is new, and is designed to change what is widely acknowledged to be the 
unsatisfactory state of the common law. Under existing common law rules, a corporation cannot 
ratify a contract purportedly entered into on its behalf before its incorporation Kelner v. Baxter 
(1866) LR 2 CP 174; Repetti Ltd. v. Oliver-Lee Ltd. (1922) 52 OLR 315. Nor can it adopt such a 
contract; to become bound it must renegotiate a fresh contract after incorporation: Natal Land 
Co. v. 
Pauline Colliery Syndicate [1904] AC 120. 
 
69. At common law, a person dealing with a promoter can find that not only does he not have a 
contract with the corporation, but he has none with the promoter, either because the latter 
expressly disclaimed liability, as in Dairy Supplies Ltd. v. Fuchs (1959) 28 WWR 1, or because the 
court concluded that it was not the intention of the parties that the promoter should become 
liable, as in Black v. Smallwood (1966) Austr. Argus Reports 744. The theory in such cases seems 
to be that the person dealing with the promoter intended to look to the corporation as his debtor 
and he cannot later turn round and select a more suitable alternative. In practice, this means that 
a great deal may turn upon the form of a 
contract and minor differences in wording may be decisive of the rights and liabilities of the 
parties And with oral contracts there are difficulties of proof and problems of conflicting 
testimony. Although the thirdparty may sometimes have other remedies against the promoter—
see Wickberg v. Shatsky (1969) 4 DLR (3d) 540—these are not always adequate substitutes for 
contractual remedies. 
                                                 
1
. (1939) 215 Ind. 409, 19 N.E. 2d 554 
2
. See also Ballantine, On Corporations (Rev. Ed. 1946) p. 103 et seq.; Lattin, The Law of Corporations (1959) p. 100 et seq.; 
and Lattin & Jennings, Cases And Materials on Corporations (3rd Ed. 1959) p. 236 et seq.; Baker & Carey, Cases and 
Materials on Corporations (3rd Ed. 1959) p. 71 et seq. 
3
. See, e.g., Cohen Report: Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment, Cmd. 6659, United Kingdom, 1945; 
Ghana Report: Final Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Working and Administration of the Present Company 
Law of Ghana, 1961; and Jenkins Report: Report of the Company Law Committee, Cmd. 1749, United Kingdom, 1962, 
amongst others. 
4
. See Paragraph 17 of the Dickerson Report, supra note 170. 
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70. The general effect of s. 2.10 is to declare that the promoter is liable on a pre-incorporation 
contract unless he takes adequate steps to procure adoption by the corporation, or he makes an 
express disclaimer of liability, or a court makes an order relieving him of liability. The 
justification for this approach is that, as a matter of business reality, the promoter is usually in 
control of the pre-incorporation and immediate post-incorporation process and is able to protect 
himself. 
 
71. If the promoter wishes to escape his obligations under the contract (and forfeit its benefits), he 
may, under subsection (2), procure the adoption of the contract by the corporation, if the contract 
is in writing. 
 
The reason for the provision that only written contracts are susceptible of adoption is simply that 
this seems the only way of ensuring full disclosure of the terms of the contract, which is an 
essential protection for the corporation. The corporation will have to make a deliberate decision 
to adopt the contract—surely the least that the shareholders are entitled to expect—and the onus 
will be placed squarely on the promoter to ensure that this is done. 
 
72. If the corporation does adopt the contract pursuant to subsection (2)(a) then, by subsection 
(2)(b), the promoter ceases to be bound by or entitled to the benefits of the contract. It is obvious, 
however, that a promoter can evade liability by procuring the adoption of the contract by a shell 
corporation with insufficient assets to meet its obligations under the contract. Section 2.10(3) 
accordingly permits a third party to apply to court for an order that, in effect, renders the 
purported adoption either wholly or partially ineffectual, and authorizes the court to impose 
liability upon the promoter notwithstanding the adoption of the contract by the corporation. 
Section 2.10(3) also permits imposition of liability upon a corporation that has not adopted the 
pre-incorporation contract. The effect of this may well be to give the third party a choice of 
debtors where ordinarily there would at best be only one. Nevertheless, we think it is desirable to 
confer a wide discretion upon the court to make adjustments. The courts will clearly not impose 
liability upon the corporation where the promoter has no effective control over it and the other 
party's sole basis for seeking an order is that he is stuck with an unsubstantial promoter. On the 
other hand, a fraudulent promoter should not be allowed to evade his obligations by hiding 
behind a corporation that he in fact dominates. 
 
73. But s. 2.10(3) does not authorize the imposition of liability upon a promoter who has expressly 
and in writing disclaimed liability, whether or not the corporation has adopted the contract. The 
inclusion of an express written disclaimer should make the third party fully aware of the kind of 
arrangement he is getting himself into, and there seems no case for allowing the court to override 
the provisions of the disclaimer. On the other hand, a valid disclaimer will not prevent the court 
from imposing liability upon the corporation in an appropriate case, even if it has not adopted the 
contract. 
 
It noted the "unsatisfactory state of the common law" of pre-incorporation contracts, and endorsed the 
recommendation of the Lawrence Committee that the promoter  should  be  held  liable  until  the  corporation  
adopts  the  contract,  but  added  that  the promoter should be able to contract for an express waiver of liability, 
and that a court should have the  power  to  order  that  the  promoter  be  relieved  of  liability.1 The  rationale  
provided  by  the Dickerson Committee for promoter liability prior to adoption by the corporation was that 
"as a matter of business reality, the promoter is usually in control of the pre-incorporation and 
immediate post-incorporation process and is able to protect himself."2 
 
The Committee also recommended that a corporation should be able to validly adopt only written 
contracts because: 
"this seems the only way of ensuring full disclosure of the terms of the contract, which is an 
essential protection for the corporation.”3 
                                                 
1
. Poonam Puri, The Promise of certainty in the law of Pre-incorporation Contracts, Canadian Bar Review, Vol. 80, pp. 1051-
1064, 2001. 
2
. See Paragraph 17 of the Dickerson Report, supra note 170. 
3
. Ibid. 
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X. Pre-Incorporation Contracts in Sri Lanka and Nepal 
Even in Sri Lanka section 23 of the Companies Act makes provisions for pre-incorporation contracts 
and ratification of pre-incorporation contract within specified period:  
23. (1) For the purpose of this section and sections 24 and 25 of this Act, the expression “pre-
incorporation contract” means —  
(a) A contract purported to have been entered into by a company before its 
incorporation;  
(b) A contract entered into by a person on behalf of a company before and in 
contemplation of its incorporation.  
(2) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, a pre-incorporation contract may be 
ratified within such period as may be specified in the contract or if no such period is specified, 
within a reasonable time after the incorporation of such company, in the name of which or on 
behalf of which it has been entered into.  
(3) A pre-incorporation contract that is ratified under subsection (2), shall be as valid and 
enforceable as if the company had been a party to the contract at the time it was entered into.  
(4) A pre-incorporation contract may be ratified by a company in the same manner as a contract 
may be entered into on behalf of a company under section 19.1 
 
In Nepal also, section 17 of the Nepalese Companies Act defines a pre-incorporation contract thus:  
Section 17 (1) A contract made prior to the incorporation of a company shall be a proposed 
contract only, and such contract shall not be binding on the company.  
(2) If, prior to the incorporation of a company, any person carries on any transaction or borrows 
money on behalf of the company, such person shall be personally liable for any contract related 
with the transaction so carried on, subject to Sub-section (3).  
(3) If, within the time mentioned in any transactions or within the reasonable time after the 
incorporation of a company, the company, through its act, action or conduct, accepts any act, 
action or conduct, accepts any act, action to borrowing done or made prior to the date of  
authorization  to  commence  its  transactions  or  endorses  such  act  or  action,  that transaction 
shall be binding on the company and the other contracting party; and the person carrying out 
such act to action shall be released from the personal liability to be borne pursuant to Sub-
section(2). 
  
XI. Evaluation of Section 72 of the CAMA 
According to Kigho-Oyolo Maro,2 the present legal position of pre-incorporation contracts is to the 
effect that a company may ratify such contracts on incorporation, and before such ratification, a promoter who 
had entered into such a contract shall be personally bound except where an express agreement to the contrary 
exists, i.e., that he would not be so bound. Second, and conversely, the benefits accruing from such a contract 
inures to the promoter, unless the corporation decides to ratify the contract.3 
Interpreting Section 72(1) of CAMA, Agomo has stated that: 
Sub-section (1) like Section 13(1) of Ghana Companies Code 1963 has abolished the rule in Kelner 
vs. Baxter. Ratification is now possible unlike the position at common law. But ratification is not 
automatic and it is not compulsory. It is entirely at the discretion of the company. Upon 
ratification, however, the company becomes subject to the liabilities and is entitled to the benefits, 
from the contract. This means that it can enforce its right by legal action and vice versa.4 
 
According to Kiser D. Barnes,5Section 72(1) has completely hurtled the difficulties in legal theory 
disallowing a ratification of a contract made on behalf of the company prior to its incorporation. The injustice 
and unwarranted technicality of enabling a company to deny contractual liability when the directing minds who 
                                                 
1
. Law net Government of Sri Lanka, 
http://www.lawnet.lk/sec_process.php?chapterid=2007Y0V0C7A&sectionno=23&title=Companies%20Act&path=7 
(Accessed 13th October 2014). 
2
. Kigho-Oyolo Maro, Principles and Practice of Nigerian Corporate Law and Management, (Comfort Hills Law Publishers, 
2009) at 15-16. (Hereinafter “Maro”). 
3
. Ibid. 
4
. See Agomo, supra note 20, at page 84. 
5
. KISER D. BARNES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON NIGERIAN COMPANY LAW, (Obafemi Awolowo University 
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promoted and incorporated the company are still the ones who stand to benefit from the technicality, the 
statutory innovation were in accord with commercial reality.1 
Another feature of Section 72(1) of CAMA is the abolition of the distinction between Kelner vs. Baxter 
and Newborne vs Sensolid.2 This is basically for the benefit of the third parties who may be unaware of the 
promoter’s style of executing the agreement.3 Nevertheless, sub-section (1) of section 72 clearly changed the law 
by abolishing the distinction between Kelner vs. Baxter and Newborne vs Sensolid as well as the second arm of 
the rule in Kelner vs. Baxter by according the discretion on the new company to ratify the pre-incorporation 
contract.4 
Yet, section 72(1) of CAMA has some significant problems. First, it does not contain specific 
provisions as to the time period for the ratification of the pre-incorporation contracts. 5  Second, there are 
problems posed by the separate legal personality and limited liability characteristics of a company.6 For instance, 
while Section 37 of CAMA prescribes that a company acquires contractual capacity from the date of its 
incorporation, Section 72(1), in turn, gives the company power to ratify acts done before it had acquired the 
capacity to do the same thing.7 To Agomo, this conflict is not cured by the use of the phrase: “..as if it has been 
in existence at the date of such contract” in Section 72(1).8 Therefore, Professor Agomo submitted that the 
conflict could be resolved by the insertion of the additional words—“notwithstanding any other provision to the 
contrary in this or any other statute,” between the words “and” and “thereupon” to read as follows: 
72.    (1)          Any contract or other transaction purporting to be entered into by the company or by any 
person on behalf of the company prior to its formation may be ratified by the company after its 
formation and thereupon, notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary in this or any other 
statute, the company shall become bound by and entitled to the benefit thereof as if it has been in 
existence at the date of such contract or other transaction and had been a party thereto.9 
 
With the above amendment, the lacunae will be neutralized—neutralizing both the legal personality 
obstacle and the doctrine of agency, and of privity of contracts to give the issue the special treatment it deserves. 
In addition, by making ratification discretionary, the common law objective of protecting the unformed company 
from unfair and unconscionable gains has been preserved.10 
Finally, in practice, section 72(1) of CAMA when employed by an astute but unscrupulous 
promoter/incorporator may work disadvantage against third parties. The concept of separate legal personality 
expounded in Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd,11will work to separate the promoter from the corporation. Where 
the third party would have been able to fully recoup his losses from the incorporator, but the less-buoyant 
company has ratified the pre-incorporation, with the effect that there can be no reversal on the ratification, the 
third party gets short-changed.12  This has led commentators to suggest the requirement that the third party’s 
consent be obtained prior to the ratification by the company.13 In Agomo’s view: 
A suggestion has been made that “a possible way of avoiding this absurdity is by seeking an order 
of apportionment from the court as obtains under Section 14(3) of the Canadian Business 
Corporations Act.”14 
 
The only snag is that the Nigerian CAMA does not contain similar provisions to Section 14(3) of the 
Canadian Business Corporations Act.15  
Concerning sub-section (2) of Section 72, this was enacted to provide covering for the third party, so 
that the third part’s contract will never be a nullity. In effect, the artificial distinction in Newborne vs Sensolid is 
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. Ibid per Barnes, at 58-59. 
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. See Oserheimen Osunbor, The Status of Pre-Incorporation Contracts, The Doctrine of Constructive Notice, the Ultra-Vires 
Doctrine and the Rule in Royal British Bank vs Turquand Under the Companies and Allied Matters Decree 1990, A Paper 
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now a historic relic. The third party may choose to go after the company, but, if the company decides not to 
ratify after registration, the third party may pursue the promoter to the fullest. 
XII. Effectiveness rule (ut res magis valeat quant pereat) 
It is a rule of law that the legislator intends the interpreter of an enactment to observe the maxim ut res 
magis valeat quam pereat (it is better for a thing to have effect than to be made void). He must thus construe the 
enactment in such a way as to implement, rather than defeat, the legislative purpose. As Dr Lushington put it in 
The Beta:1 
... if very serious consequences to the beneficial and reasonable operation of the Act necessarily 
follow from one construction, I apprehend that, unless the words imperatively require it, it is the duty 
of the court to prefer such a construction that res majis [sic] valeat, quam pereat. 
 
The rule requires inconsistencies within an Act to be reconciled. Blackstone said:  
 
'One part of the statute must be so construed by another, that the whole may, if possible, stand: ut 
res magis valeat quam pereat.2  
 
It also means that, if the obvious intention of the enactment gives rise to difficulties in implementation, 
the court must do its best to find ways of resolving these. 
An important application of the rule is that an Act is taken to give the courts such jurisdiction and 
powers as are necessary for its implementation, even though not expressly conferred.3 It is therefore submitted 
that Nigerian judges should adopt the ut res magis valeat quam pereat rule, and, by so doing, decide cases 
involving pre-incorporation contracts by resorting back to the concept of the stipulatio alteri by which – 
‘where the persons have entered into a contract for the benefit of a third, the latter may, before the 
promise has been revoked, accept it and thus acquire a right of action...’4 
 
To reiterate, under the concept of the stipulatio  alteri, the third party may accept the benefit even if it did not 
exist when the promise was made, where such a third party, particularly a company not incorporated at the time 
of the agreement, purports to ratify or adopt the contract made for its benefit. 
XIII. Conclusion 
With the recent global economic downturn, International Oil Corporations (IOCs)5 are increasingly 
focused on exploring business opportunities in regions with significant projected growth opportunities such as 
Africa and Asia.6 Several IOCs have recently flocked to Nigeria, a prominent West African country, with the 
recent stable political climate, immense population (about 170 million), and projected double digit growth rate, 
and so the country has quickly become a destination of choice for small and large international companies, alike, 
seeking to take advantage of the perceived business opportunities therein.7 It therefore, necessarily follows that 
Nigeria must brace up its corporate laws to take advantage of the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) that will help 
boost and sustain the Nigeria economy, and there is no other veritable means than providing sufficient and 
beneficial protections for the IOCs seeking to form and incorporate businesses in Nigeria.  
It is possible to simply adopt common law rules of equity, without statutory intervention. For instance, 
as pointed out by Prashid Raj Singh8 in India, Section 15(h) of the Indian Specific Relief Act,9 allows the 
company to enforce the pre-incorporation contract against the thirds parties.  
Further, similarly, under the provisions of section 19(e) of the Indian Specific Relief Act, specific 
performance may be enforced against a company where its promoters have, before its incorporation, entered into 
a contract for the purpose of the company and such contract is warranted by the term of incorporation of the 
company by inclusion in the article of association it is however necessary that the company in such a case must 
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. (Blackstone 1765, i 64) 
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. Buckley v Law Society (No 2) [1984] 1 WLR 1101. 
4
. See, Nkala & Nyapadi supra note 129, at 59-63. 
5
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6
. Akinbiyi Abudu, Taxation of Expatriates in Nigeria—Trap for the Unwary, in Ernst & Young: Our African Footprints. Tax 
focus News and updates across the African continent Issue 5, Vol. 51, 2011. Available at: http://emergingmarkets.ey.com/wp-
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. See, Akinbiyi Abudu, supra note at 19. 
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have accepted the contract after its incorporation and communicated such acceptance to the other party to the 
contract.1  
We here make the following suggestions to bring Nigeria law at par with contemporary common law 
countries. First, Nigerian CAMA must make similar provisions to govern within which the company is to ratify 
or reject the pre-incorporation contracts so that the third party who has interest in the contact may look for other 
means to enforce the contact and protect his interest. 
Second, the CAMA must make provisions for deemed ratification, i.e., if the corporation fails to ratify 
within a certain period, the third party should assume that the inaction of the new corporation is an implied 
ratification. In Nigeria, we suggest three (3) month grace period because of inflation. If the injure party were to 
wait for a longer time, the high rate of inflation would have made benefits of the contract nonsensical and 
valueless. 
The CAMA should also make that the value of the pre-contract must be stated in the objects and 
memorandum of association of the company, especially where the value of the pre-incorporation contract is 
equal or greater than the total value of the allotted shares of the company.  This is so that the third parties can 
apprise themselves of the value of the pre-incorporation contract towards enabling them to make informed 
decisions. 
It is also suggested that where the value of the pre-incorporation contract is equal or greater than the 
total value of the allotted shares of the company, a notarized copy of the pre-incorporation contract must be 
lodged with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC). 
It is also suggested that in meetings where the shareholders or the Board of Directors are deciding 
whether or not to ratify the pre-incorporation contract, interested members or directors shall not vote at such 
meetings. 
In addition, we also suggest that where the company rejects the pre-incorporation contracts, the third 
party should be given rights to pursue both the promoter and the company, especially where the company has 
taken the benefits of the pre-incorporation contract.  
In these days of sophistication, provisions must also be made for the promoter to waive his liability by 
expressly contracting out of liability imposed by statutes 
Finally, it is also suggested that where a third party is stranded and cannot obtain relief under the 
statute, he should be permitted to fall back to common law rules. Thus, in his book, The Law of Contract in 
South Africa (3rd ed.), the eminent author R H Christie states thus:2 
“There is ample authority for thus falling back on the common law, and it may well be correct to 
say that s 35 is not intended to apply to pre-incorporation contracts which qualify as contracts for 
the benefit of a third party, but it does not seem to matter which view is taken because as 
TROLLIP JA observed in Sentrale Kunsmis Korp (Edms) Bpk v NKP Kunsmis-verspreiders 
(Edms) BKP 1970 (3) 367 (A) 398, s 35 is usually invoked and complied with for safety’s sake even 
if it is not necessary, and if the attempt to comply with it fails no harm is done provided the 
contract qualifies under the common law. In the days before what is now s 35 the courts very 
properly applied the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat to interpret the promissee’s position 
as that of a principal rather than an agent in a doubtful case, but in Peak Lode Gold Mining Co 
Ltd v Union Government 1932 TPD 48 51 GREENBERG J thought the section made it no longer 
necessary to lean away from agency. There is no doubt so if the section has not been complied 
with, but if it has not the position remains unchanged.”3 
  
As stated earlier, the goal of company law is to encourage entrepreneurship and enterprise efficiency, create 
flexibility and simplicity in the formation and maintenance of companies, and, to provide for the creation, role, 
and uses of companies in a manner that enhances economic welfare of the citizenry.4 Nigerian CAMA must 
stridently support these goals. 
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. Section 19(e) of the Indian Specific Relief Act, 1963. 
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. See, R.H. Christie, The Law of Contract in South Africa (3rd ed.) at p 293. 
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